

# Public property, political regulation and independent regulation for the public services

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# public property, political regulation and independent regulation for the public services

1. Public services: definition, development
2. The History of Public Ownership
3. Network services
4. The rise of regulation
5. Are uniformity or coordination necessary?

# public property, political regulation and independent regulation for the public services

## 1. What is Public Service

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# What is “public service”?

- Traditional definition: **all services provided by public entities**
- Referring to contents: services
  - which are necessary or very useful to life (of individuals, of the community) so as to be included in the area of public responsibility
  - which will not be provided by an unregulated market in a satisfactory way because of:
    - **inequalities (in income, wealth)**
    - **externalities (benefit / damage to third parties)**
    - **public goods (non-rival, non-excludable)**

# Public services in the European Union



- 1957: the Treaty of Rome (6 countries) established the European Economic Community (Common Market)
- 1987 Single Market Act
- 1991 the Maastricht Treaty established the European Union (12 countries)
- 2007: Lisbon Treaty reformed the EU
- Now 28 countries have a Single (Internal) Market

# Public services in the European Union

The treaties refer to “services of general interest” **identified by the Member states**, and distinguish:

## **Economic services (services of general economic interest, **SGEI**)**

- Economic activities that public authorities identify as being of particular importance to citizens and that would not be supplied (or would be supplied unsatisfactorily) if there were no public intervention
- Examples: transport networks, postal & social services
- SGEI are **subject to the rules of the EU Treaty**: open market, competition or competitive bidding

## **Non-economic services of general interest**

- Usually provided by public entities, not subject to specific EU legislation, except basic principles such as non discrimination

# Public services: increasing or shrinking?

- Needs grow
- Expenditure for services increases (health, education, networks)
- Services increasingly provided by private companies, under concession and often in competition
  - *(in the EU terminology: within the SGIs, the share of the SGEIs increases)*
- Direct public provision is shrinking

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## 2. The historic role of public ownership: the reasons in favour

- a. a substitute for missing private initiative and an engine for development
  - (the “infant industry” theory, basic industries)
- b. a provider of public goods
- c. a remedy to monopoly, externalities, inequalities
- d. a remedy to “natural” monopoly (network services)

## The declining role of public ownership

- Public ownership justifies a monopoly (benevolent?)
- Most objectives may be attained with other means:
  - Legal obligations, limitations
  - Economic incentives
  - Competition among suppliers
- ideology: “public is always better”
  - The market is simply bad, an engine for inequality
- an opposite belief: “private is always better”
  - A symmetric ideology?
  - A consequence of a disappointing public sector?

## The basic weaknesses of public ownership

- Conflict between profit maximisation and implementation of political directives
  - **Evaluation of results: which benchmark? how to assess the responsibility of managers?**
  - **Government-owned company expected to behave different from private and to compete at the same time**
- State aid: contrary to trade agreements (and to EU law), hard to define in the case of a public company

# When a decision to privatise is taken

- Half-hearted privatisation:
  - when originated not from a programme for improvement
  - but from Government need for revenue or inability to fund company growth
- Sale of minority shares
  - An opaque compromise?
  - Or a step towards a competitive market?

# The alternatives to public ownership

- promote development: good rules, infrastructures
- provide public goods: contracting out
- correct externalities (taxes, incentives)
- correct inequalities (obligation to serve)
- **contrast monopoly: large open markets, antitrust law and competition authority**

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### 3. Network services

- In presence of a network (physical or virtual), competition may be impossible or uneconomic: this is a classic case of “natural” monopoly
- Traditional consequence: a legal monopoly and a concession of the whole service to a public-owned or to a private-owned company

# objections

## **Even a public monopoly does not escape the monopoly's weaknesses:**

- no contest, no incentive to efficiency, no choice, no room for entrepreneurship
- moreover: political interference, investment is a burden on public finance
- size of company limited by political boundaries



# Alternatives: a) private monopoly + regulation

- Prices (tariffs) set by a public body
  - This is the traditional notion of “regulation”
- Also quality levels, environmental standards should be set
  - Regulation is complex
- A regulated monopoly is better than an unregulated monopoly, yet some important faults remain:
  - **No choice**
  - **Little room for initiative and entrepreneurship**
  - **Risk of political patronage**

## Alternatives: b) tendering out the service

- Tendering introduces competition among bidders
- The service is provided under (a temporary) monopoly
- Monopoly power is limited by terms of tender and by contractual obligations
- Monitoring of tariffs and of performance is required

### Difficulties and Requirements:

- duration of contract
- public administration's capacity for tendering, monitoring
- sufficient competition in bidding is necessary

**Problem:** local preference for local company may distort the tendering

# Alternatives: c) network unbundling, free access, competition in services

## Networks (monopolies) regulated and accessible:

- Unbundling (accounting, legal, ownership)
- Contents of network regulation: tariffs, rules for access
- A role for the industry regulator
- A role for the competition authority

## Problems:

- Brand names
- Why should the network remain under public ownership instead of being tendered out? **A combination of (b) and (c)**

# Competition for services works well if ...

- A sufficient number of competitors
- A market large enough to allow optimal size of company
- Transition in liberalisation: divesting the public company or parts of it is controversial, may create conflicts
- Transition problems in pricing: from regulated tariffs to free market prices
- **Problem:** protection of low-income or otherwise disadvantaged customers

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## 4. The rise of regulation

- the US tradition of regulation
  - **Public Utilities Commissions since early 20th century**
- in Europe
  - **public (or semi-public) ownership made regulation seem unnecessary**
- a revolution started around mid-1980s
  - **deregulation, opening of markets, privatisation**
  - **objectives: efficiency through competition, shrinking and re-orientation of State functions**
  - **an independent authority has been seen as necessary**
  - **rise of regulatory authorities 1990-2005**

# Political regulation vs. independent authorities

- reference case: the rise of independent central banks
- the case for “tying one’s hands” in the regulation of public services
  - useful as a defence against demagogic temptations
  - necessary in presence of Govt-owned companies
- the importance of independent regulation in transnational investment in infrastructures (view of the World Bank)

# The task of a regulator

- set tariffs for monopolistic services
- promote competition where possible
  - access to networks
- set technical standards for safety, interoperability
- promote development of infrastructures using obligations and incentives
- protect weak consumers
- advise Government



# Local services, competition and regulation

- The local area is too small for setting up a regulatory authority
- The local administration may be weak in contracting out the service, in designing and managing a tender
- Potential conflict between the national regulator and the local administration
- New ways must be explored to reconcile localism and good use of the market

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## 5. Are uniformity or coordination necessary?

- the extreme cases:
  - high uniformity needed in financial markets
  - low uniformity needed in local services
- instruments for coordination
  - top-down: treaties, legislation, institutions
  - bottom-up: cooperation, information, best practices
- Problem: the “regulatory gap” between multinational companies and national (local) regulation

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